

Profile of district Dera Ismail Khan

with focus on livelihood related issues



South Asia Partnership-Pakistan

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Dera Ismail Khan
with focus on livelihood related issues

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This publication is a result of a research exercise carried out to understand and document the current status of different ways and means of earning livelihoods in a group of selected districts of Pakistan and other factors that have an impact on people's capacity to utilize available resources and that of creating new ones. The study is a part of South Asia Partnership, Pakistan's (SAP-PK) strategy to realize its mission of creating an engendered, critical society in South Asia based on the universal principles of human dignity, justice, democracy and peaceful coexistence. As member of South Asian civil society movement, SAP-Pk is striving to empower marginalized sections of society and working to influence policies in their favor.

Data for the study is collected through secondary as well as primary sources. The secondary data is mostly quoted from Population Census 1998, Agriculture Census 2000, Agriculture Machinery Census 2004, Industry Census 2004, Animal Census 2006, Punjab Development Statistics 2008 and other government sources. Information from some departmental studies like Multiple Indicator Cluster Study by Planning Commission 2003-04 has also been used. The figures have been projected to the latest year using growth rates. But growth rates for some parameters are either not available or are generalized for the national or provincial level as their district break-ups are not available. This may have resulted in not very accurate projected figures for the district. We however believe that this is unlikely to undermine the broader conclusions drawn from these.



Livelihood has very rarely been a subject for any scientific research despite its utmost importance. The need to initiate such work was absolutely necessary, as the traditional livelihood sources are rapidly depleting. This situation has pushed a large portion of population, especially those who have been associated with agriculture and traditional sources of earning in rural areas. They are left stranded as far as their livelihood sources are concerned. This factor contributes substantial rise in poverty. The situation is particularly affecting the landless and the farmers with small land holdings and rural workers. The women farmers and tillers belonging to religious minorities are the worst affected as they were solely dependent on traditional modes of earning.

In this scenario the work in hand is a commendable task undertaken and completed by the writers. It is a wonderful effort in the right direction. The work definitely provides a basis for further research on livelihood sources. There is not only occasional analysis included in the profile but the facts and figures provided also stimulate the reader to build up different analysis. The book very clearly shows how the nature and availability of livelihood sources can have effects on poverty and poor people.

This research work was conducted in 15 districts of all four provinces. The districts selected include

where the South Asia Partnership has been working since its inception for the betterment of poorer sections of the society through various initiatives. The publication gives a detail description of demographic factors such as population of male and female in the district and how these differences denote to discrimination and bias against women-folk of the country. The research focuses more on female population of the rural areas with stress on maternity health, literacy, enrollment and drop-out ratio among girl students.

The district profile also notes the changes in pattern of livelihood sources. It also deals with the number of issues such as health facilities, transportation and communication, irrigation, pattern of crops, land ownership patterns, livestock and industrial growth in the district. The work includes the politics of international trade agreements and its implications on Pakistan's industrial and agricultural sectors and especially on livelihood sources of the population. All the facts are substantiated by related data which is another quality of this work.

It is in fact a valuable addition in the efforts of South Asia Partnership- Pakistan spanning over the periods of two decades in the field of research especially on the subjects related to poor farmers and rural workers. And of course livelihood stands high in this list.

I want to conclude by removing some misconceptions prevalent in our 'intellectual' brethren about the efficacy and usefulness of written work. They opine that since the South Asia Partnership-Pakistan is working for the peasant and rural workers, the big majority of those are unable to read so the written work will be fruitless. I wonder if one goes with this approach then the publishing and printing of books should be halted at once, for even the big majority of literate population has no tendency towards reading the books especially on serious subjects. The efficacy of the written work cannot be measured by mere number of souls who have actually read it but by the effects the work has generated. To quote an example "DAS CAPITAL" would have been, most probably, read by some thousand people but the effect it produced and still generating is even immeasurable.

This work will definitely be helpful for the policy makers, for the development experts, for non governmental organization in evolving their strategies to coup poverty and deprivation. The research is capable of organizing peasants and workers both rural and industrial around identified issues.

Mohammed Tahseen
Executive Director



The biggest part of the 'Daman' area is [Dera Ismail Khan](#). Daman is the geographical term used by the locals for the floodplain region at the western bank of Indus River that mainly falls in present day NWFP. Furious hill-torrents occasionally pour down from western Suleman mountain range and join the mighty Indus passing through Daman. Daman was once considered as the gateway to South Asia owing to its traversable numerous mountain passes connecting Afghanistan and the Central Asia to Pakistan and the Sub-continent. Invaders and traders continued to pass through Daman for centuries before the advent of new transportation systems and routes. The area is a seat of ancient civilizations as is evident from the ruins found at Rehman Dheri and Kafir Kot. The archeological remains of later periods suggest that the area was once part of Hindu Shahia region.

The Muslim Pashtun tribes' influx from the Suleman Range started somewhere in 12th century and continued for two centuries. The Lodhi tribes of Prangi, Suri,

Sarwani and Bilach were the first settlers. These with the exception of Bilach of Paniala were gradually ousted by the Lohani tribes whose sub-branches Daulat Khel, Marwat and Miankhel settled in Daman.

In 1467 Hussain Shah, the Langah ruler of Multan gave this area to a Baloch chief, Sohrab Khan, who established posts and forts to guard against raiders from the west. The town of Dera Ismail Khan was founded in the name of his son Ismail Khan somewhere in the beginning of 16th century.

In the beginning of 17th century Kati Khel branch of Daulat Khel settled in Tank under Khan Zaman Khan, who managed to push Marwat further north to the desert of Lakki. As he was helped in this adventure by the Gandapurs there, he arranged for their settlement in the centre of Daman, the area which they now occupy.

By the end of 18th century, the area went under the direct rule of Ahmed Shah Abdali, whose son Taimur Shah gave the Nawabi of Dera Ismail Khan to the Sadozai chief Nawab Muhammad Khan, a cousin of

the ruler of Multan Nawab Muzaffar Khan Sadozai. The Sikhs took it over in 1836 just before the death of Ranjit Singh.

After the second Sikh war in 1849 this district was annexed by the British along with the rest of the Punjab. Bannu district was also a part of Dera Ismail Khan but in 1861 it was separated. From 1861 to 1901, Dera Ismail Khan district had five tehsils namely Tank, Kulachi, Bhakkar, Layyah and Dera Ismail Khan. It was also made the divisional headquarter of Derajat in 1861 and remained so till the formation of NWFP province in November 1901.

Dera Ismail Khan district was included in NWFP with the exception of the trans-Indus areas of Bhakkar, Layyah and Vahova circle of Dera Ghazi Khan, which were given to Punjab. The district then had three tehsils namely Dera Ismail Khan, Kulachi and Tank. Tank was made an independent district in July 1992.

A new tehsil within Dera Ismail Khan was also created with the name of Paharpur.

Dera Ismail Khan was made a division in one unit as the country was regrouped into East and West Pakistan. It was in fact one of the only two divisions of present-day NWFP. All the southern districts were included in this division while central and northern districts were made parts of Peshawar division. DI Khan enjoyed the status of division until the abolishment of the commissionerate system in 2001 although the geographical area under its missionary squeezed considerably with the inception of two more divisions in the region during these 46 years, namely Kohat and Bannu. The division, one of seven in NWFP, at the time of its abolishment included DI Khan and Tank districts.



Total population in 2007
10,18,796

Tehsil population (as percent of total)

D.I.Khan	Kulachi	Paharpur
57.9%	18.6%	23.5%

344 villages 4 towns


Rural	Urban
85.3%	14.7%

Population distribution
among villages

Population	No	% share
Above 5000	31	42.4
5000 to 2000	74	32.0
2000 to 1000	76	16.0
Less than 1000	163	9.6
All villages	344	100.0

Towns	Tehsil	Population 07
D.I.Khan	D.I.Khan	103,873
Kulachi	Kulachi	22,828
Paharpur	Paharpur	17,414
D.I.Khan Cantt	D.I.Khan	6,145

Dera Ismail Khan is the southern most district of NWFP and is bounded on the north by Tank and Lakki Marwat districts, on the east by Mianwali and Bhakkar districts and on the south by Dera Ghazi



Khan district of Punjab while on its west are the Tribal Areas adjoining DI Khan district, South Waziristan Agency and Tank district.

Most part of the district is a dry **alluvial plain**. The only hills, within the district, are those of Khisor Range, which lies in the north-eastern part. The Khisor Range is also known as the Ratta Koh or Koh-e-Surkh meaning the red-mountain. It runs close to the Indus River in a north-east to

south-west direction. Further north-west, parallel to the Khisor Range along the border of Dera Ismail Khan and Lakki Marwat districts, is the Marwat Range, which runs up to Pezu pass in the south-west. The highest point in Khisor Range is 1,046 meters above sea level while the highest point of Marwat Range is 1,376 meters.

Dera Ismail Khan occupies an area of 7,326 square kilometer. It is the third largest district with respect to area in the 24 settled districts of the province. Only two settled districts Chitral and Kohistan in NWFP are bigger than Dera Ismail Khan. Both these districts are situated in two different rough mountainous terrains and many parts of these districts are virtually uninhabited. Dera however, is not only home to a sizeable population, it is a destination for a lot of economic migrants both from Punjab and NWFP. The average area of NWFP districts is 3,105 square kilometer with Chitral leading as the largest districts with an area of 14,850 square kilometer. Malakand



is the smallest district with an area of just 952 square kilometers.


The district has extremes of **climate**. The summer season is dry and hot. Temperature begins to rise in April and the months of May, June, July and August are extremely hot. June is the hottest one in which the temperature shoots above 42 degree centigrade. In May and June the humidity is very low. The hot wind, called loo, blows across the district. The cool wave starts somewhat in October. December, January and February are the cold months. The daytime temperature in winter is not very low however it falls sharply at night. The weather is cold and frost is severe. In January the mean minimum temperature is 4 degree centigrade.

Dera Ismail Khan has three **teshils** namely Dera Ismail Khan, Paharpur and Kulachi. Only 15 per cent of population lives in four urban centers, largest


Urban concentration in NWFP

Urban Share in Population

- 20% and above
- 10% to 19%
- Below 10%
- 0%



Percentage share of urban population in NWFP districts



being Dera Ismail Khan city with a population of just over one hundred thousand, according to 2007 estimates. The rest 85 per cent lives in 344 rural localities.

On an average, 17 in every 100 persons live in cities in NWFP. Peshawar has the highest ratio of urban population (49 percent) while there is no urban locality at all in Shangla, Kohistan, Buner and Battagram districts of the province. Half of the districts of the province have less than 10 per cent portion of urban population. Dera falls quite close to the provincial average.

Around 34 villages in the district have a population of more than five thousand people that are categorized as big villages while 74 are inhabited by two to five thousand people considered as medium sized villages. A quarter of rural population lives in 239 villages, which host less than 2,000 souls.

Total **population** of the district according to 1998 census was 8,52,995 with an inter-censal percentage increase of 72.5 percent since March 1981 when it was 494,432. The average annual growth rate was 3.26 percent during this period. This is very high percentage against the provincial average of 2.81 and national 2.69. The growth rate in Dera Ismail Khan is the 7th highest among NWFP districts.

NWFP can easily be divided into two parts, one comprising southern districts has quite high population growth while the other composed mostly of northern districts exhibits low population growth. One reason for this may be intra-province migration of population for economic reasons. Districts with

growth rate higher than provincial average:

1 Buner	3.86
2 Peshawar	3.56
3 Lower Dir	3.42
4 Swat	3.37
5 Malakand	3.36
6 Shangla	3.27
7 DI Khan	3.26
8 Karak	3.26
9 Kohat	3.25
10 Hangu	3.25


The population growth in the district between the previous two

census (1981 - 1972) was 2.5 percent suggesting that the district grew faster afterwards.

Propagated at the national annual growth rate, the population of Dera Ismail Khan district is estimated to be 1,018,796 in 2007. That gives a population density of just 115.4 souls per square kilometer, which is third lowest in NWFP province with Peshawar leading as the most dense districts (1,606 persons/sq km) and Chitral being the thinnest (21 persons per square kilometer). The entire northern NWFP is thinly populated due to rough terrain and inaccessible mountains.

As emerged from the 1998 census the population of district is predominantly Muslim - 99.3 per cent.

There are few **religious minority** groups in NWFP as the average Muslim percentage in provincial population stands at 99.5 per cent. It means that one in 200 persons of NWFP believes in a religion other than Islam. Peshawar hosts the biggest



population of religious minorities, who make 1.3 per cent of the district's total population. Muslim population in all other districts is more than 99 per cent. In real numbers there were only 1,676 Christians, 1,127 Ahmedis and 441 Hindus in Dera Ismail Khan in 1998. An overwhelming majority of the tiny minority of Christians (83 per cent) and Hindus (78 per cent) lives in DI Khan city. However, Ahmedis are scattered in rural areas of Dera and Paharpur tehsil.

Population of male and female is not and has never been equal in most parts of the globe. Females are naturally more in numbers for a variety of reasons.

United Nations figures tell us that there are more females than males in 119 of the total 191 countries in the world. It is equal in 10 and female population is less than that of males in the rest 62.

In the developed countries of Europe, USA, Australia and Japan, there are 105 women against every 100 men. The figure is 102 in the poor continent of

Africa as well as in Latin America. In a sharp contrast, number of females is less than that of males in China, South Asia and Middle East.

Pakistan besides falling in the list of countries with lower **female to male ratio** is also one of the only four countries where life expectancy at birth of females is less than that of males. In

Pakistan, female population per hundred male population is 92. Situation is worst in Balochistan where the ratio is 87, while it is 89 in Sindh, 93 in Punjab and 95 in NWFP.


Number of female per 100 male population in the Dera Ismail Khan district (sex ratio) is 90. This is below the national average of 92 and provincial average of 95.

If all the districts of Pakistan are arranged in descending order of sex ratio, DI Khan stands at number 75 among 106 districts. Highest ratio is in Chakwal (109.1) while the lowest is in District Malir of Karachi (78.9). There are only ten districts where


the ratio touches the hundred mark.

The age wise breakup of sex ratio in DI Khan shows the three troughs in female life that are typical for all parts of the country. The first decline starts right from the birth and lasts till the age of 15 years as the nutritional and health care requirements of the girl child are not taken care of by the families that prefer sons over daughters.

Girls and young women play a very important role in agriculture. There are numerous house and farm chores that are considered solely the job of women. As they cross puberty, their 'productive value' increases and their number improves dramatically. This is also their reproductive age. In DI Khan, the number of women of age 20 to 30 compared with 100 men is the highest for any age group in the district. But the good luck of the female population starts and stops in this age group. They start bearing children and suffer heavily from maternal health problems. This is also the



- 1 Son preference and discrimination against girl child is responsible for the decline in their numbers from 0 to 14 years of age.
- 2 Very high maternal mortality rate is likely to be instrumental in great fall in number of women from the age of 20 to 45 years.
- 3 Poor health care seems to be the dominating factor in reduction in number of women from 50 years on ward. The two surges within this period can't be explained.



age when they become victims of honor related crimes and discriminations. As the graph shows their numbers tumble sharply till the age of 45. The female population gets a brief respite at the end of reproductive age and their number again climbs up. But this relief is also short lived and their number again takes a downward slide.

At around the age of 50, generally the daughters-in-law take over the charge and the old women's role in the family shrinks to marginal and complementary jobs. They don't have any social security resources to draw upon for their health care. They neither have ownership of any resources like land. In comparison old men are more likely to be enjoying some pension or might be in possession of a property which makes them more preferable for their children when it comes to expenditure on

health care and taking care of other old age needs. There are sharp differences in the sex ratio for the rural and the urban populations. For example, the number of females aged 20 to 24 in rural DI Khan is 100.4 meaning that in this age group the number of women is a little more than that of men. But in urban areas their number is only 88.1. This may be an expression of the difference of 'economic value' of women in the two societies. It may also be due to varying patterns of male economic migration from the two regions or a cumulative impact of these and other factors.

Seraiki is the mother tongue of just 3.2 per cent people of NWFP. Pashto is the **mother language** of the majority population of the province (73.9 per cent), one per cent speak Punjabi and under one per cent Urdu. The language of 20.4



per cent people is put under 'others' column since Hindko, the second largest spoken language of the province is officially not recognized. Same is the case of Pahari spoken in Kohistan district and a number of other languages spoken in Chitral and other parts of northern areas.

DI Khan's language situation is different from that of the province. The mother tongue of the district's 72.4 per cent people is Seraiki. Around 22 per cent speak Pashto while the mother language of 3.26 per cent people is Urdu. Less than one per cent people here speak Punjabi. The majority of DI Khan and the neighboring Mianwali people speak same language but the people of both districts name their language differently. Majority of Mianwali persons (74 per cent) call their language Punjabi while DI Khan people prefer to call it Seraiki.

In rural areas only 0.6 per cent people say their mother tongue is Urdu while 18.6 per cent of urban population of the district has Urdu as their mother


tongue. Pashto is spoken by 23 percent in rural areas and by 16 percent in urban areas. There are more Pashto speakers in Kulachi tehsil (31 percent) than in DI Khan and Paharpur tehsils.

Overall **literacy** rate of the district is just 31.3 percent according to 1998 census report, with highest being for urban males (75.02 percent) and lowest for rural females (11.3 percent).

In overall population of the

province two in every five men can read and write while only one in five women know how to read and write. Literacy rate of DI Khan is 12th lowest in the province, with Kohistan hitting the bottom with just 11 per cent literate population.

The entire NWFP province shows the unfortunate pattern of low female literacy (just 19 per cent) as compared to male literacy (51 per cent). This huge difference implies that male children are prioritized over girls as the male education is attached to employment in public and private institutions while girl education is considered a burden on resources of the household and/or affront to the prevalent social norms. Similar pattern is visible in DI Khan as well. However, it is among the few districts where male-female literacy disparity is relatively lower than other parts of NWFP. There are 37 literate women against 100 literate men in Dera. Haripur leads this trend with 54 literate women per 100 literate men while Kohistan is at bottom where only



13 women are literate against 100 literate men. It is important to note that the neighboring Mianwali is the worst district in Punjab with respect to male-female literacy ratio and there are 35 literate women against 100 literate men.

There are 14 districts in NWFP, where male literacy is more than 50 per cent while there is no district, which has the same literacy rate for women population. The best district in female literacy is Abbottabad where only 39 per cent of females of 10 years and above age are literate. Keeping aside the two Hazara districts of Abbottabad (39) and Haripur (37), there is only Peshawar (26) where one fourth of female population is literate. Rest is a sorry tale of neglect. There are seven districts in the province where female literacy is under 10 per cent. In Kohistan only 3 per cent while in Batagram only one per cent of female population of ten years plus age is literate.

(The table shows Name of district, overall literacy, Male literacy, Female literacy and Relative female literacy or number of literate females per 100 literate

Gender gap in literacy

	Overall	Male	Female	Relative
Abbottabad	57	75	39	54
Haripur	51	69	34	54
Peshawar	42	56	26	41
Kohat	44	65	23	37
Malakand	40	55	23	39
Mansehra	36	51	23	48
Nowshera	43	61	23	34
Chitral	40	58	22	37
Mardan	36	54	18	32
Swabi	36	54	18	34
Karak	42	68	18	29
D.I. Khan	31	43	18	37
Charsadda	31	47	14	28
Swat	29	43	13	29
Lower Dir	30	49	12	27
Bannu	32	51	12	22
Hangu	31	53	10	20
Laki Marwat	30	50	9	17
Tank	26	42	9	19
Buner	23	38	8	21
Upper Dir	21	36	6	17
Shangla	15	25	4	14
Kohistan	11	17	3	13
Battagram	18	29	6	21
NWFP	35	51	19	35

A typical household

■ In a typical house of Dera Ismail Khan 7.7 people live. Urban households are a little bigger, with 7.9 persons, than the rural that have on average 7.5.

■ In rural areas of the district 29 per cent people

live in a one room house with average family size of 5.2. In urban areas the ratio of people living in one room is little less at 23 per cent but the family size is bigger, which is 5.7.

■ Half of the urban and three fourth of the rural houses are made of unbaked bricks.

■ By 1998, around 30 per cent of village popu-



lation was yet to benefit from electricity facility.

■ One third of the rural population does not have latrine facility inside their house.

■ Wood is the main fuel both in urban and rural areas.

■ In 1998 two third of the rural and almost half of urban did not have access to television.

males.) It is worth mentioning here that this is the situation of the settled districts of the province and if the Frontier Regions (FR) and tribal agencies are included the picture gets even bleaker. For instance the female literacy rate in FR region of DI Khan is just one per cent.

Highest literacy rate (61 per cent) in the district is in Dera Ismail Khan city where 80 per cent male and 64 per cent female were literate in 1998. In rural areas of this tehsil, however, the male literacy rate is 41 per cent while for female is just 15 per cent. In rural areas of Paharpur 39 percent males are literate but only 6 percent women can read and write. Rural

Kulachi however is the worst within DI Khan district in terms of female literacy and resembles more with the tribal areas. Overall literacy rate here is 15 per cent. It is 24 percent for males while for females is just 4 per cent.

A later study, Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey 2004-05, notes that overall literacy in the district has accrued up to 38 percent (from 31.3 percent in 1998).

School enrollment for children aged 5 to 9 in NWFP is 44 percent (excluding Katchi class) during the year 2003-2004. The difference between the districts of the province is quite big. The Hazara division and dis-

districts of Karak and Peshawar enjoy a good ratio of net enrollment while in rough hilly terrains the ratio is very low. It is over 70 percent in Abbottabad, 64 in Mansehra, 63 in Haripur and 62 in Karak while in Kohistan and Shangla districts it is 27 per cent. Net enrollment rate at primary level in district DI Khan is 35 percent which is lower than the provincial average and the district can be ranked as 3rd lowest with respect to school enrollment. It means that almost two in every three children of school-going age are not attending schools in DI Khan.

19 percent children in the district are not vaccinated. **Health** statistics of the district are poor by any standard. By 2000, there were 11 hospitals and 30 dispensaries in the district with 466 beds available for the entire population of the district. There were 48 rural, basic and sub health centers working in DI Khan in 2000. The total number of doctors and nurses was 191 and 43 respectively. There is one doctor for every 4,736 persons and one nurse for 21,038 people. The total number of available beds in the hospitals of the district is 466, which means that there is only one bed for 1,800 people or in other words 5.4 beds for 10,000 people. This ratio is below the national average.

Pakistan in general is ranked in the bottom 10 countries of the world in this regard as the country has only 7 beds for every 10,000 persons. This average is 165 for Japan, 30 in Sri Lanka, 17 in Iran and 13 in Iraq.

A comprehensive Lady Health Worker (LHW) program was started in Pakistan some years back, under which around 100,000 LHWs have been

trained. These LHWs are trained to provide antenatal (before birth), delivery and postnatal (after birth) medical care to the pregnant women besides treating other minor illnesses. There were only 50 LHWs in the district in year 2000.

Multiple Indicators Cluster Study of NWFP (Unicef 2001) shows that infant mortality rate for the province is 79 per 1000 live births. (Infant mortality rate or IMR is the number children that die before their first birthday per 1,000 live births.) IMR for Dera Ismail Khan is one of the highest, 83, in the province while the lowest is in Haripur, 63 and the highest in Kohistan, 104. Dera also has one of the highest percentages of malnourished children in the province that is 42.8 percent. It is higher than the provincial average of 38.3 percent malnourished children and falls far short of the Millennium Development Goal target for the year set at less than 25 percent.

Like many other districts of NWFP, DI Khan too has an adjoining **tribal area** named as Argah Shirani with an area of 2,008 square kilometer and a population of just 39,000 souls. With nominal livelihood sources in this rough terrain of Suleman Range, the population growth is negative (-2.09). People prefer to migrate to other areas in search of livelihood. Shirani area has no urban locality and is controlled by District Coordination Officer of the DI Khan. Contrary to the district, the mother tongue of overwhelming majority of Shirani tribes is Pashto while literacy rate is extremely low as only 10.6 per cent people know how to read and write. The female literacy is at the lowest; 1.4 per cent only.



Agriculture is the major economic activity in the district. Most of the district is a dry alluvial plain.

Agriculture in Dera Ismail Khan has three main features; low land utilization due to limited resources of irrigation; dominance of big land holders and high ratio of tenancy.

More than half of the available cultivable area (52 per cent) of the district is not cultivated due to lack of irrigation water. Land use intensity in DI Khan is far behind the provincial average of 73 per cent. Irrigation in DI Khan mostly depends on hill torrents. An inundation canal from the Bilot creek was planned and its extension tagged as Paharpur canal started operations in 1907 as a seasonal canal only to become a full-fledged perennial canal in 1970 with the completion of Chashma Barrage head work. Rod Kohi system is still operational in the entire Daman territory in which water of hill torrents is stored in small or medium sized ponds for irrigation.

Tube-well use has also increased in recent years in the district. The land use statistics however have changed quite a lot with the completion of the latest phase of the Chashma Right Bank Canal that started working after the last Agriculture Census held in 2000.

According to Agriculture Census 2000, of the irrigated area of the district one quarter is sailaba or barani that is it is either inundated by the river or is rain fed. The rest three quarters irrigated through man-made facilities is around of 274 thousand acres. A third of this benefits from canals and another third by tube wells and almost the same number by Rodh Kohi system. Rod Kohis are second most important source of irrigation in the district. Tube-wells are equally important as they exclusively irrigate one fourth of the irrigated area. Tube-well supplemented canal water, however, does not come out as a major option and only six per cent of the irrigat-

ed land is fed on both sources simultaneously. The tubewell use in the district is very high compared to other NWFP districts thanks to easy pumping of ground water especially in kacha area. There were 1200 tubewells in the district in 2004. This means that there is one tubewell for 39 farming families. DI Khan is the seventh largest district to have more access to tubewell water after Malakand, Swabi, Buner, Nowshera, Karak and Kohat. On an average there is one tube-well in NWFP for every 63 farming families. All tubewells in DI Khan are diesel-powered pumping machines and none is provided electricity. Electricity-run tubewells are only 2 per cent of the total tubewells in the district.

According to a careful estimate as many as 115,805 families live in the rural areas of the district. Out of these little less than half (46,473) families (45 per cent) are directly linked with farming while the remaining 55 percent have no access to agricultural land. The livelihood of most of the essentially landless and non-farming families is either attached with trade, industrial labor, rural service industry, livestock or simply daily wage labor.


If we keep the 55 per cent landless and non-farming rural population aside, the **land ownership** in the remaining 45 percent farming families is extremely unequal. DI Khan is the land of big landlords. The Agriculture Census counted only 8,675 big landlords in the district in year 2000. They are 19 percent of the farming community yet they occupy two-third of the Dera's cultivable land. Their average land holding is 65 acres. The other third is occupied by medium sized landlords who make up half of the

Access to land


Dera Ismail Khan



29% farmers have access to 4% of cultivable land
Average access: 2.3 acres
Number of farmers: 13,035



54% farmers have access to 34% of cultivable land
Average access: 11.2 acres
Number of farmers: 24,762



17% farmers have access to 62% of cultivable land
Average access: 65.4 acres
Number of farmers: 8,675

Nature of Access to land





farming community and on average own 11 acres. The small farmers though make up 38 percent of the farmers, they have access to just 3.4 percent of the district's cultivable land.

Land utilization is highest among small farmers and lowest among the big. The average small farmer of the district cultivates 1.8 of his 2.3 acres. The medium bring half of their land under plough as they cultivate 5.6 of their 11.2 acres. The biggest farmers cultivate less than half of their holding. The big farmers having access to 100 to 150 acres actually sow crops on just a third (36 percent) of their land.

One obvious reason for low land utilization is lack of irrigation facilities. But it may partly be due to the land owners' inability to mobilize enough financial resources for making cultivation a possibility. This is reflected in high tenancy ratio in the district. Out of this farming community of the district 65 per-

cent are owners while 20 per cent are owner-cum-tenants and another 15 percent are tenants only. Tenancy ratio is low in very small and very large farms while it is high for the middle ones. Only 17 percent of the area of farms that are either smaller than 5 acres or bigger than 150 acres is with tenants and the rest is cultivated by the land owners. In contrast 48

percent of the area of farms that are 5 to 150 acres is with tenants and the rest 52 percent is cultivated by the owners themselves. This shows that 'absentee landlords' have big presence in the district.

According to 2004 Agriculture Machinery Census, there is one tractor and its implements available for 27 farming families. The machinery use in the district is not encouraging especially compared to Punjab districts but by NWFP standards where there is on average one tractor for 56 families, it seems considerably good. It is worth mentioning here that there is one tractor and its implements with every 12 Punjab farming families. DI Khan comes on the list after Malakand, Hangu, Mardan and Swabi. The access of farming families to tractors in Malakand district of NWFP is equal to that in Punjab.

DI Khan's **crop pattern** matches more with that of Bhakkar, Layyah, Mianwali and DG Khan districts of Punjab. Chickpeas and mung are the spe-

cialties of the district despite the fact that wheat occupies more area than these crops. DI Khan tops in many crops in terms of production in NWFP, yet its contribution towards national production of any crop except mung, gram and melons remains inconsiderable.

DI Khan tops in the provincial production of gram, mung, jowar, guarseed, cotton, mango and dates. Besides first two crops, the area under other crops is very limited and the district is crowned firsts in their production due to the simple reason that other districts of the province don't cultivate these crops at all.

Area under wheat in DI Khan is 46 per cent of total under cultivation. The second most important crop is gram. Nine percent of the total cultivated area is dedicated to this barani crop. Similar is the case with emerging cash crop of mung, which is allotted 2 per cent of the total cultivated land. With the increasing availability of irrigation water the sugarcane and rice are also becoming popular. The former gets 5 per cent of the land while the latter occupies 3 per cent of the land. Cotton is also sown on one percent of the land and so are jowar and bajra. The acreage of melons, once the specialty of Daman has reduced considerably due to some disease attacks in recent years but despite that almost five per cent of the total cultivated land is under melon.



Following table gives DI Khan's ranking in terms of its share in provincial and national production of various crops.

Crop	Production rank in	
	NWFP	Country
Wheat	5	54
Gram	1	8
Sugarcane	4	29
Melon	1	NA
Rice	3	38
Mung	1	4
Jowar	1	30
Cotton	1	37
Bajra	2	38
Guarseed	1	10
Citrus	7	35
Mango	1	29
Guava	4	30
Dates	1	11

In rural DI Khan livestock rearing is a bigger eco-



nomie activity than cultivation. According to estimates based on [Livestock Census 2006](#), 39 percent of landless and non-farming rural population in DI Khan district rear milch animals. There are more than 46,000 farming families in the district, which have some access to a piece of land and the families reporting milch animals are more than 73,600. As almost all the farming families do have some milch animal, the excessive number of herd owning families shows that landless population is also rearing livestock.


An average livestock rearing family of the district has 4 milch animals - cows or buffaloes of milk giving age. More than 20,000 families rear sheep with average herd size of 12 animals in the district and the families rearing goats are more than 52,000 with an average herd size of 11 animals. There are 12,930 camels in the district that are mostly used to pull carts or plough the fields. Domestic poultry population in Dera Ismail Khan is around 1.3 mil-

lion. Contrary to extremely uneven land access, livestock ownership is relatively less skewed. It however is not as even as the overall provincial figures are. Small herd owners in NWFP own 75 percent of all milch animals, but in Dera the small own only 57 percent of all the

milch animals of the district. The medium and the large herd owning families of the district get more than their provincial average share. More access to land can make available more crop residue as fodder. Big land holding also increases landlords' access to cheap labor. These factors may partly be responsible for this out of the way behavior of DI Khan. Another important factor is vast tracts of river-side kacha areas that are seldom used for cultivation and mostly serve as grazing lands for animal herds. These areas are inhabited by the tribes that traditionally have herd rearing as their main livelihood.

Animal (cow and buffalo) ownership in DI Khan

Herds	Families (as % of total)	Animals	Average herd size
Small	86	57	2.6
Medium	12	32	10.7
Large	2	11	31.4
All	100	100	4.1



Chashma Right Bank Canal

Chashma Right Bank canal is an irrigation project that has been instrumental in making Dera Ismail Khan what it is today. It has been the focal point of politics in the district and had an everlasting impact on the way people live here and earn their livelihoods.

Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project is an extensive irrigation project constructing a 274-kilometer canal along the Indus River, 72 distribution canals, 68 cross-drainage structures, 91 bridges and runs through Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP.

It was initiated during the time of ZA Bhutto. The PPP maverick had contested elections from seven seats from all over the country in 1970 and won on all but from Dera where he lost to Maulana Mufti Mehmood of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. It was important for Bhutto to woo the Dera voters through a big development project. Work on project was however delayed as the initial cost estimates were substantially overrun by the later detailed work. The Bhutto government also prom-

ised the locals that they will have an almost exclusive right on the newly irrigated land. The anti-PPP alliance for the 1977 elections also promised the Dera voters changes and enlargement of this project. A year before the work on the project commenced in 1978 Bhutto had been replaced by a military ruler that did away with the law ensuring locals' first right on the newly irrigated land. As the Stage I was completed in December 1986, Dera witnessed a surge in economic migrants and land speculators. Stage II was completed in June 1992. Work on Stage III began in September 1993 and was completed in 2004. Benefits of Stages I and II have been realized, with about 240,000 acres now being irrigated. The initial benefits of Stage III are also apparent in field studies, and a detailed monitoring study reported that during the 2001-2002 winter crop season, about 66,800 hectares were cultivated. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been the main financier of the US\$454 million project. ADB has funded US\$299 million (66% of the total), and Germany through Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) has provided US\$40 million (9%). The Government has provided US\$115 million (25%).

Dera Ismail Khan's surface tapers down from Suleman mountains on the west towards river Indus on the east, the canal cannot feed the area on its west (as it cannot flow from low to a higher point). A new project Chashma Right Bank Canal (Lift cum Gravity) project envisages irrigating the western side of the canal. It plans to take

water from Chashma Hydropower feeder and guide it towards west under gravity through a 62 km canal and then lift it to a height of 64 feet through pumping. The pumps shall feed a 117 km long main canal running along the Chashma Right Bank canal. It will irrigate the area between the two main canals through 25 distributaries.

The paper work on the project was started in 2004 and it was discussed in the Central Development Working Party (CDWP) meeting in early 2005.

Wapda had raised the issues relating to preparation of feasibility, enormous size of pumps to carry 2,533 cusecs water to a height of 64 feet, large operation and maintenance requirements of the project with ever-increasing electricity tariff.

Wapda also stressed the need that the engineering of the project should be re-looked. The project was referred to the Pakistan Engineering Council for its professional advice, which formed an expert group to deliberate upon the controversial issue raised by Wapda. After detailed presentations by provincial authorities and Wapda the study group recommended to the Planning Commission to include the project in the PSDP 2006-07.

Accordingly an amount of Rs 330 million was earmarked in the budget but Water and Power Division and Wapda preferred not to utilize it. The project was again included in the development plan for the next fiscal. With a new government in Islamabad official interest in the project was renewed recently. The Deputy Speaker of the current National Assembly was elected from the Dera seat. But this fillip also dampened soon as the gov-

ernment decided to slash down the development budget for 2008-09 in February 2009 and the project has again been discontinued.

Gomal Zam Dam

Gomal Zam Dam Project is located in the Daman area of the North West Frontier Province. The Gomal River, on which a 437 feet (133 m) high Gomal Zam Dam will be built, is one of the significant tributaries of Indus River. It is planned to irrigate about 163,000 acres (660 sq km) of land. It will be a Roller compacted concrete dam, having a gross storage of 1,140,000 acre feet. It will produce 17.4 MW of electricity when completed. Approximately Rs. 4.388 billion contracts for the construction of Gomal Zam Dam Project was awarded in August 2002 to M/s CWHEC - HPE, a joint venture of China National Water Resources & Hydropower Engineering Corporation and Hanbiw Power Engineering Company. However work stopped in October 2006, after two Chinese engineers were kidnapped, one of whom was subsequently killed and the other injured in the recovery operation.

The contractors asked for negotiations for a new contract on the basis of prevailing market prices of materials, but the government of Pakistan rejected this demand. Instead the government decided on September 27, 2007 to award the contract for construction of Rs 13 billion Gomal Zam Dam to Frontier Works Organization (FWO) and a Turkish firm Tekser, who had been runners-up in the original tender.

A few powerful political figures and influential families have been dominating Dera Ismail Khan's **electoral politics** all through its history.

The religious party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) has a little edge over Pakistan Peoples Party. Sardar Abdul Rashid Khan and Mufti Mahmood were the most powerful political figures of the district, who rose to national prominence in 1950's and 60's. Mufti Mahmood's political heirs still dominate the district's politics.

Besides these two personalities Kundi and Gandapur Pashtun families are also on the political scene since long. Both the families gained prominence from the PPP platform. The elections on the sole DI Khan national seat have been a tug of war between JUI and PPP with JUI winning six times while PPP has been victorious twice.

It is important to note that Pashtun dominate the politics of this Seraiki-majority district of NWFP. Dera Ismail Khan gave three chief ministers to the province and one chief minister to West Pakistan in the One-Unit days. First one was Sardar Abdul Rashid Khan who remained Chief Minister from 1953-1955, second was Maulana Mufti Mahmood (1971-1973) who was succeeded by his fellow *Derawal* Sardar Inayatullah Khan Gandapur (1973-1975).

There was no representation of DI Khan in the first constituent assembly of Pakistan. The three NWFP members reaching this assembly included Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Sardar Bahadur Khan and Asadullah Jan Khan.

In the second constituent assembly of the country, NWFP was allotted four seats and one of the mem-

bers Sardar Abdul Rashid Khan was from DI Khan. In the indirect elections of 1962 Mufti Mahmood returned from the seat allotted to DI Khan.

The first-ever elections of the provincial assembly held in NWFP after creation of Pakistan were conducted in 1951 in which Surkhposh or Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek, the biggest political power of the province at that time, was legally barred from contesting. Ruling Muslim League emerged as a big winner amid loud allegations of rigging by Jinnah Awami League and independent candidates. In the 88-member house, Muslim League got 67, Jinnah League 4, non-Muslims 4 and independents 13. Muslim League was the major winner in Dera Ismail Khan too.

The elections from 1970 to 1997 on the sole Dera national seat are an interesting tale of rising JUI influence. However the provincial seats are shared by Kundi, Gandapur, Alizai, Miankhel and Syed families with almost no share of JUI. In 1970 elections Mufti Mahmood won the seat and the episode was repeated in 1977 as well. In 1985 Mufti family did not contest elections from the district and Pir Sabir Shah was elected defeating Sardar Inayatullah Gandapur. Mufti Mahmood's son Maulana Fazlur Rehman won the seat in 1988 but in 1990 he lost to a PPP candidate Fazl Karim Khan Kundi.

However, Fazlur Rehman managed to reclaim this seat in 1993 before again losing it to a PML-N candidate Sardar Umer Farooq in 1997.

For 2002 elections Dera Ismail Khan was allotted one full national assembly seat while it shared another with Tank district. The electoral performance of religious parties peaked in 2002 elections

2002 2008

NA 24 D.I. Khan



NA 25 D.I. Khan



Of the 272 thousand valid votes polled in NA 24 and 25 in 2008, MMA secured 33.4 percent. But on the six provincial seats in the same area the party polled only 22.2 percent of the valid votes. Same is the case with PPP. The situation has not been different in 2002 elections. Independents with ethnic and tribal appeal are better placed at the local level than most parties in the district.

and both the DI Khan seats fell to Maulana Fazlur Rehman. He defeated PPP's Faisal Karim Kundi on exclusive Dera seat with a margin of 6,000 votes. On the shared seat Fazl defeated Dawar Khan Kundi of PPP with a big margin of 27,000 votes. Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the alliance of religio-political parties could not repeat its success on provincial front in Dera Ismail Khan district as it lost on all of the provincial seats. Two seats were won by seasoned parliamentarian Sardar Inayatullah Khan Gandapur as an independent candidate, one by PPP, one by PPP-Sherpao and last of the five seats was bagged by another independent candidate Hafeezullah Khan Alizai.

In 2008 elections, incumbent deputy speaker of National Assembly Faisal Karim Khan Kundi of Pakistan Peoples Party defeated Maulana Fazl at the exclusive DI Khan seat with a big margin of more than 37,500 votes. This was the biggest electoral defeat, the Mufti family had ever conceded. The seat shared by DI Khan and Tank districts, however, provided a consolation win to Attaur Rehman, the brother of Fazl, who edged past Habibullah Khan Kundi of PML with a margin of just over 1,800 votes.

In provincial elections five seats were divided between three parties and two independents. One seat each was won by PPP, PPP-Sherpao and PML. Khalifa Abdul Qayum and Syed Murid Kazim Shah were winning independent candidates. Alizai and Gandapur families were represented by PPP's Latifullah Alizai and Sherpao's Israrullah Gandapur. Sardar Inayatullah Khan Gandapur had breathed his last before these elections.

Politics of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam: Madrassahs as political constituency

The traditional royal patronage of Muslim clergy effectively ended with the revolt of 1857 leaving the ulema in disarray. They however re-organized themselves a few years later by founding Darul uloom Deoband in about 1866. Deoband decided to focus on education of Muslim youth in Islamic studies and on guiding the Muslim populace on Islamic matters but couldn't resist entering the political realm for long. Its chief Mahmud Hasan was exiled to Malta Island for conspiring against the British rule during the First World War.

A number of notable ulema, graduates of Deoband, later formed Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) in December 1919. It was not designed to be a political party in the common sense of the word and its role in politics was a subject of debate right from the beginning.

A group of ulema favored an advisory role for JUH on matters of religion leaving the rest to the mainstream political parties. They saw no problem with living and practicing Islam in a country where majority was non-Muslim. They supported Congress in its struggle against the British rule. This group was led by Hussain Ahmed Madani whose treatise written in 1938 (titled United nationalism and Islam) was sharply contested by the other group. Maulana Madani's three-point philosophy governed the Jamiat politics; non-violence, one Indian nation and separate electorate. The one-Indian-nation concept made the maulvis of JUH politically secular. These

clerics used to preach inter-faith harmony. Some district office-bearers of the JUH also held offices of Congress party. Congress meetings in mosques and madrassahs were not rare during the Independence movement.

The other group within Jamiat, led by Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, had a soft corner for the Muslim League. He resented the one-nation concept and believed that Islam can only be practiced in a State ruled by Muslims. A breakup of JUH became eminent when the Muslim League formulated its demand for a separate homeland in 1940. Maulana Usmani joined Muslim League in 1944 and later formed Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) in 1946. In its initial phase the party looked more like a loose group of Deoband ulema that had little agenda besides supporting the Muslim League and counteracting against JUH. Maulana Usmani became member of Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly and drafted the Objective Resolution that the Assembly passed as the founding document for the constitution of the new country. Maulana passed away in March 1949 and the JUI also outlived its political role.

Though JUH could not win against Muslim League in most parts of the country in 1945-46 elections, it got few seats including two provincial ones from NWFP. The speaker of NWFP assembly Allah Nawaz Khan belonged to JUH. Moreover, the majority of Deoband graduates in Pakistan had

established madrassahs in NWFP.

Though Maulana Usmani's JUI became extinct with his death, the Deoband ulema did have a political constituency and the new country was never going to get short of the hotly contested religious issues. In 1954, Maulana Mufti Mahmood convened a convention of Deoband graduates where Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam was revived. Maulana Ahmed Ali Lahori agreed to lead the organization after his fellows conceded to his demand to organize the new party on Sharia basis and not on modern political lines. Maulana Lahori was made Amir and not the president of the party. Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, Ahtesham Thanvi, Mufti Mahmood and Abdullah Darkhwasti were among major leaders of this party. After the death of Maulana Lahori, Abdullah Darkhwasti was made new Amir while Mufti Mahmood became its general secretary in 1961. In 1962's indirect elections Mufti Mahmood and Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi were elected to national assembly.

Mufti Mahmood, a Marwat Pashtun from Dera Ismail Khan, shot to prominence through his vehement opposition of new Family Laws in Ayub's National Assembly. The JUI also came to be known for being vocal against Ahmedis and Shias. Mufti's image was tarnished when he voted for the amendment that enabled incumbent president to contest elections. Ayub Khan was short of just two votes from the two-third majority needed to amend his own constitution. Later Jamiat neither supported Ayub Khan nor Fatima Jinnah in presidential elections of 1965. Mufti Mahmood and Ghaus Hazarvi retained their seats in national elections.

Though JUI had its own 'Islamic' justifications for its wayward political behavior, pragmatism became a hallmark of the party.

JUI was slow to respond but quick to adapt to the changes in Pakistan's politics that started taking effect in late 1960s. There were three main religious parties in the country. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, the Bareilvi party, was limited to Karachi. Jamat-e-Islami of Maulana Maududi though had a strong base in Karachi too but was not confined to this area dominated by the Urdu-speaking migrants from India. Moreover, Jamat was modeled on the lines of a communist party that aimed to capture State power to implement its model of Islamic government. JUI however still had the JUH traits as it was less ambitious and wanted to sustain as an effective pressure group to ensure that Islam is not flouted with by any government.

JUI's stronghold was the Pashtun area of NWFP and Balochistan that in 1960s was 'getting ready to welcome' a socialist revolution. The political influence of Soviet Union in Afghanistan and in NWFP was increasing and National Awami Party (Wali), the main political force in the two provinces, was considered as a cover-up for a communist party. JUI went soft on socialism as an economic system and almost condoned it. It supported the PPP's agenda of abolishing feudalism and of nationalization of many industries and institutions. Many believe that the Islamic in PPP's coined term of 'Islamic socialism' was an expression of the influence of the JUI. Jamat Islami was at 180 degree from JUI on this count. JI's Maulana Maududi gathered 113 clerics

Madrassah boom

There were a total of 137 madrassahs in Pakistan in 1947. Their number kept rising in all the later years though the pace has been different during various periods. Their number leapt at a phenomenal rate after the 9/11 incident in 2001. Madrassah statistics are generally shoddy as they don't come under any one centralized governmental authority. Each sect has its own madrassah board. According to the most conservative estimates there are around 13,500 madrassahs in the country with over one million pupils.

The number of madrassahs doubled in five years after 9/11. This mushrooming has few important characteristics.

The highest growth has been recorded in


Deobandi madrassahs. A good part of these is directly affiliated to Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam.

The building of a madrassah has traditionally been initiated by the local people and they were supported by local philanthropists. But now more and more madrassahs are built and run through donations received from organizations and individuals belonging to the Middle Eastern Arab countries.

Though the greatest number of madrassahs is in Punjab yet NWFP and Balochistan have more madrassahs per population than any other place in the country. In Balochistan madrassahs are concentrated in northern Pashtun areas alone. The combined NWFP and Balochistan Pashtun areas have more madrassahs than anywhere else in the country.



Provincial breakup

There is one madrassah for every 3,085 males aged between 5 and 20 in the country. Graphic gives provincial breakup.



Sectarian divide

Source: ICG No 95, 2005



from all over the country in a conference to issue a decree that socialism was kufr (infidelity) and the people with socialist inclinations have ceased to be Muslims. JUI was the only dissenting voice against this Fatwa.

In 1970 elections JUI got 7 seats in center, 4 in NWFP and 3 in Balochistan assemblies. National Awami Party (Wali) had 13 elected members in the NWFP Assembly and needed the support of JUI

and independents to form its government. JUI did extend its support but only on the condition that its candidate, Maulana Mufti Mehmood himself, will be the Chief Minister. His biggest qualification was that he could defeat the PPP maverick ZA Bhutto on the Dera Ismail Khan seat. (This was the only one of the seven seats that Bhutto had contested all over the country but lost.) Maulana got his wish but his party split as Maulana Hazarvi who had a

Resisting reforms

Deobandi ulema institutionalized the madrassah system, and gave it an administrative and academic structure. They adopted Dars-e-Nizami after overturning its emphasis on non-religious studies.

■ Ayub government attempted to regulate auqaf property - non-transferrable religious endowments. Almost all madrassahs were dependent on this income to meet expenses. An Auqaf Department was created to regulate shrines and madrassahs and bring religious institutions under state control by integrating them in the formal sector. Responding to the challenge, by 1959 four wafaqs - or federations of madrassahs - were organized, along sectarian lines, to defend themselves against the state's attempts to trespass on their autonomy. Ayub's madrassahs reforms failed to make an impact.

■ ZA Bhutto nationalized the education sector but madrassahs were exempted and remained autonomous. He also attempted to co-opt the madrassahs by offering to grant them the equivalence of public sector certificates and diplomas. The highest degree of the Deobandi wafaq was placed

on a par with a master's degree in Islamic Studies from a government university, provided madrassah students passed a bachelor's level English course.

■ Zia government conducted a national survey of madrassahs and the report of the committee (The Halepota Report) proposed improving the economic condition of madrassahs and modernizing them with the aim of eventually integrating the religious and the formal education sectors while conserving the autonomy of madrassahs. Halepota also suggested to create employment opportunities for madrassah graduates and also recommended direct government financial assistance without conditions. Zakat funds were identified as the source of government support. The recommended curriculum changes did not alter the domination of religious subjects but only suggested inclusion of some modern subjects at the primary, secondary and graduation levels. The committee's recommendations could not become law because of clergy's opposition. Still, Zia implemented much of the Halepota Report and also took other steps to co-opt the madrassahs.

On Zia's directions the highest certificates of wafaq

soft corner for PPP broke away. JUI (Mufti) also became part of Balochistan government with the same anti-PPP alliance of NAP (Wali), JUI and independents taking over the power.

Mufti Mahmood banned liquor sale in NWFP, waived mark-up on farmers' loans and made Urdu a compulsory subject in NWFP before resigning in 1973 in protest against the federal government's act of dismissing the Balochistan government on

charges of high treason. JUI took part in agitation against the Bhutto government. It also actively supported anti-Ahmedi movement. JUI-Mufti joined the grand national alliance against PPP before 1977 elections, which converted its allegations of rigging in elections into a protest campaign that ended with the imposition of Martial-Law. JUI became part of the Zia cabinet soon afterwards and helped the dictator in introducing Hudood ordinances. The

boards were conditionally recognized as an MA in Arabic or Islamiyat. Without shifting the balance of studies or changing the mediums of instruction and teaching methods, madrassahs were thus upgraded to the level of the formal education system.

■ Benazir Bhutto banned entry of Arab students and made it compulsory for all foreign students and their madrassahs to obtain a No Objection Certificate by the foreign ministry. Provincial zakat committees were instructed to end funding to madrassahs without proper scrutiny. The government also approached foreign governments responsible for funding Pakistani sectarian institutions. Pledging to reform the madrassahs sector, PPP interior minister Naseerullah Babar disclosed the government's intention to introduce compulsory audits, new curricula, and registration. None of this happened.

■ Musharraf government launched a Madrassah Reform Program in 2002. It envisaged a new legal framework and a centralized Pakistan Madrassah Education Board. It aimed at making financial audits compulsory for the seminaries and regulating entry of foreign students. It promised to modernize curric-

ula and an integration of these into the formal educational system. The program offered huge sums to the madrassahs opting to join it yet it failed miserably. Critiques doubt that the program was never intended to achieve its stated objectives as the seminary ulema had been the main partners of Musharraf in his campaign against the two mainstream political leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Moreover, no madrassah was willing in any way to disclose its sources of income and open its accounts books for public. The program launched by the education ministry terminated in 2008, reached only 507 out of more than 10,000 registered seminaries, and was deemed a failure even by its coordinator. The religious ministry started a separate MRP in 2005, although it made significant concessions to the clergy, for example dropping the requirement for madrassah managers to disclose sources of income.

■ The PPP-led present government has announced that it would establish a madrassah Regulatory Authority to oversee the workings of seminaries.

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three JUI ministers however resigned after few months in protest against 'half-hearted' Islamization efforts of the Gen Zia regime.

Mufti Mahmood died in 1980. His death created a leadership gap that split the party into various factions. However, the faction led by Mufti's son Fazlurrehman made it to the mainstream. The faction led by Maulana Abdul Haq of Akora Khattak also has presence in NWFP. This faction is now led by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, son of Abdul Haq. The other factions disappeared from the political scene. JUI (Fazl) did not join the grand alliance of the right wing parties, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) that was cobbled together to check the PPP's second rise to power in 1988. Jamat was one of the most enthusiastic partners of this alliance led by Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif. As Jamat remained on a roller coaster of power with Nawaz Sharif over the next decade, JUI preferred to live calmly in its cozy Pashtun corner. Three elections down the road, Jamat and JUP were left high and dry by their lead coalition partner in IJI. A frustrated Jamat boycotted the 1997 elections while JUI continued with its solo flight.

The JUI is known for its pragmatic approach in politics. It defends its strategy as principled for it finds it necessary to remain afloat in the national politics to achieve the ultimate objective of Islamization of governance and society. But pragmatism started bordering with opportunism as success in politics started translating into perks and privileges, both at the individual and the party levels notwithstanding the fact that these things remain unproved allegations that are traded on a large scale in day to day

politics of our country.

Another important characteristic of the JUI has been that its appeal remained confined to Pashtun areas and pockets. Thousands of madrassahs of Deoband ulema spread all over the Pashtun areas are its main constituency. JUI had a low profile all through the 'Jihad' against Soviets in Afghanistan as Jamat Islami led from the front. But as soon as students of its madrassahs (Taliban) assumed the main role in Afghan war theater, JUI became a force to reckon with and outshone Jamat in politics of the last decade.

The new military government had effectively barred the two mainstream parties, PPP and PML (Nawaz), from participating in the 2002 elections. JUI was able to convince the disgruntled Jamat, JUP and other religious parties to join hands in filling the political gap and making the best use of the new geo-strategic situation arising after 9/11 and the subsequent US attack on Afghanistan. The alliance called Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) achieved more than it could expect. MMA ruled over NWFP and was a coalition partner in Balochistan for next five years. Jamat in its own ideological calculations found itself at loss in the alliance and was not attracted towards the 2008 elections. Jamat decided to go for a boycott citing, of course, its political principles; JUI's resolve to stay afloat in national politics come what may remained unwavering. The party is content with its typical 2 percent share in national votes and six seats in parliament that it secured in 2008 and of course its many thousand madrassahs spread all over the country.



Dera Ismail Khan: Living next door to an endless war

The Daman floodplain, of which Dera Ismail Khan is a part, is the geographical and historical junction of Pashtun and Baloch tribes. The area has been pulled back and forth in the tug of war between the western Pashtun tribes and rulers in Punjab. It was part of the Punjab when the British annexed the province in 1849. In 1901, the British carved out another province out of Punjab namely North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Dera Ismail Khan district was included in the new province with the exception of its trans-Indus areas of Bhakkar, Layyah and Vahova circle of Dera Ghazi Khan, which were given to Punjab.

The older district was divided and allotted to different governance units either on the basis of administrative convenience or for some strategic reasons. For the colonial rulers, an area mostly represented a

sum in revenue and various 'revenue figures' were clubbed together to make one financially viable administrative unit. Whatever the reasons the placement of Dera Ismail Khan in an administrative setting that fails to appreciate its social and cultural realities had profound impact on the district.

The district's demography has changed since then. The pace of change increased sharply in the recent past owing to migration of Pashtuns from neighboring tribal agencies especially Waziristan Agency. Though the district still maintains its Seraiki character, the tribal Pashtuns with their typical outlook, weapon being an integral part of it, tend to dominate the social map now.

The local Seraiki population is very bitter about this change and most nurture the feeling that they are discriminated against by the Pashtun governments

of Peshawar. NWFP is linguistically the most diverse of the Pakistan's provinces. Its northern most parts are home to mountain communities where tens of distinct languages belonging to different language groups are spoken. The language of majority in Kohistan district is Pahari and in Hazara area (Abbottabad, Haripur and Mansehra districts) most speak Hindko. Seraiki is the dominant language of Dera Ismail Khan. Yet the main stream political parties are too much Pashto focused and fail to attend to the issues of the minority groups.

Many in Dera Ismail Khan in fact believe that the provincial government not only discriminates against them, it is in fact following a policy to out

number Seraikis in their own area by promoting Pashtun migration. They also resent that the provincial government does not recognize the first right of locals on the livelihood resources of the area.

Wazirs and Mehsuds from North and South Waziristan agency started arriving in Dera during late 1970s when Chashma Right Bank Canal project was announced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In order to avoid land speculation; an ordinance was passed by the government namely The NWFP Chashma Right Bank Canal Project (Control and Prevention of Speculation in Land) Ordinance 1971. This Ordinance restricted transfer or sale of land in project's command area to the non-locals. Under the

Survival of the ruthless

It was a routine working day for Jahangir Abbas, a Shia businessman of DI Khan when he received in his shop a letter from Lashker-e-Jhangvi. Jahangir and his brother run a watch-mending-and-selling shop that their father had started in 1984. The letter was an open threat telling him to wind up his business or get ready to be killed. Worried Jahangir shared it with fellow shopkeepers, who in turn informed that they all had also received such letters. There was a commonality among all those

who had received letters, they were all Shias. None could afford to wind up their businesses. They took precautionary measures, started shutting down shops early in the evening and hired security guards. But all these measures couldn't prevent what was planned, and the first shopkeeper was shot dead on an evening of 2007, when he was going home after closing his shop. That was only the beginning. Six shopkeepers since then have been killed in this bazaar, and there have been attempts to set fire to many shops. But the worst was yet to come. One morning Jahangir

received a call from the mobile phone of Basit Abbas, one of his relatives, but it wasn't Basit on line. Somebody told him that Basit is seriously injured and is in hospital. He told that Basit needs blood donation immediately so please rush to hospital. When Jahangir reached hospital, he saw around 300 Zaidi Shias already gathered there and most of them had received a similar call. They were further shocked when told by the hospital staff that Basit has been dead for more than an hour. These people were yet trying to figure out the situation when a powerful bomb blasted right in

initial plan the capacity of the canal was 7,762 cusecs. All the opposition parties united in 1977 elections (Pakistan National Alliance-PNA) against Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. The controversial elections were followed by a protest campaign that ended with the imposition of Martial Law. During the protests in Dera Ismail Khan City, the PNA demanded to increase the capacity of CRBC project to 10,762 cusecs. PNA also promised that if it comes into power it will change the design of the project.

In order to please the PPP opposition and win support of Pashtun dominated parties, ANP and JUI, Zia government amended the law and repealed the ban

on land transfer in the command area of CRBC. Once the ban was annulled, Wazir and Mehsud tribes flooded Dera Ismail Khan with the money earned through all possible means.

This was the time when Zia regime decided to host the Western powers' proxy war against the Soviet Union that had invaded Afghanistan. The tribal areas became the recruiting ground and the jump pad for the so-called Mujahideen for launching guerrilla activities inside Afghanistan. The tribal men joining the 'Jihad' were showered with billion of dollars by their Western masters mostly through covert deals. Narcotic dealers and gun runners also flourished at great speed.

the middle of them. 45 people, most of whom were young, aged 15 to 30 years, died in this blast and around 70 were critically injured. The worst part of the story is that the hospital staff refused to treat the injured as they had been threatened that if they did so, the whole hospital will be savaged. Government ambulance was available but there was no driver to take the injured to any other hospital. Those who had their own vehicles drove their injured, to the hospitals of other cities, mainly Bhakar as nobody in DI Khan would dare treat them. Many died on the way and many lost



their organs for not getting immediate care.

Jahangir lost his legs and an eye in this accident. He wasn't able to continue his business in the main bazaar. He opened a much smaller one inside his own

mohallah, just beside his home.

Since that day in 2006, his business is completely down. The family has almost consumed all that it had saved and depends on small grants from community members to survive.

The people of tribal agencies however found it unsafe to invest their fortunes in their own areas even after the end of the war. The areas are semi-governed and property ownership is not documented and protected by the government. The traditional justice system is either weak or heavily biased in favor of the powerful few. For the tribal elite of Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan is the place of choice for building a villa or owning a swath of agricultural land.

The influx of tribal migrants in DI Khan was somewhat directed towards the Seraiki dominated areas as the only tehsil with considerable Pashtun population, remained out of bounds for the new comers. Wazirs can't shop around in Tehsil Kulachi of DI Khan as a piece of provincial legislation hindered them. The area is dominated by the Gandapur tribesmen and their chief Sardar Inayatullah Khan Gandapur managed to secure Kulachi when he was Chief Minister of the province and the provincial assembly passed a legislation under which the ban on sale of land to non-locals was maintained in this tehsil.

Tank has been a tehsil of Dera Ismail Khan till 1992 when it was declared an independent district. It is the smallest district of the province in terms of population with only one urban locality, its capital Tank had a population of 35 thousand in 1998. The Seraiki leaders of DI Khan believe that Tank never deserved to be declared a district and that the decision was made only to further isolate the Seraiki population within NWFP. 80 percent of Tank's population had Pashto as their mother tongue while 18.5 percent had Seraiki in the 1998 census.

Wazir migrants are not used to rule of law. There is no documentation of property and Patwar system as we know in settled areas does not exist in the tribal agencies. Protecting ones property is a personal feat and if one possesses excessive coercive power he does not hesitate in using it to even expand his property. Locals of DI Khan have many tales to tell about how a migrant initially bought a small piece of land in an area and then occupied neighboring lands. The local owners move court for stay order, rush to Tehsildar Office, and District Revenue Department for demarcation to ascertain the original boundary, but all that takes too long and yields too little. At the end the best they could achieve is to 'sell' their land to the occupier at a throw away price. The tribal migrants also are able to use their dual residence status and strong intra-tribe bonds to avoid prosecution in criminal proceedings. Any one committing even a murder can simply skip to his homeland which is out of bound for police and judicial system and his economic interests in the district are faithfully looked after by one of his fellow tribesman. Some groups are utilizing these legal lacunas to run organized crime gangs.

The tribal migrants have not limited themselves to the agricultural land; they now dominate the local business as well. The tribal agencies are the main source of smuggled goods of all kinds available in the entire country. Most of these are imported under the Afghan Transit Trade agreement and reach the agencies without paying any customs at Karachi port. They are then transported back to all parts of the country using the many unguarded routes in the

The garland of wilting flowers

Shah Behran owns a business of renting out marriage parties paraphernalia (tents and catering service) in DI Khan. The grim faced man in his fifties responds with a sarcastic smile when asked about how his business is doing these days. "Dera was once called Phullan da sehra (a groom's flowery garland)," he would sigh, "but today I feel like crying to see what Dera has become."

There is no business, he tells categorically and narrates how it has gone down. He repeats the same story that every small local businessman has in this city. He believes that the problems only started when the tribal areas became the centre of the war and every tribesman was bestowed with the most sophisticated type of personal arms. "We have always had Gandapurs, Sadozais and Alizais from Tank and Bannur coming to Dera and never had a problem with them. We even had relationships with them and they used to speak Seraiki and knew all about our culture." He tells that the situation changed for worse only in 1980s when group after group of tribesman with unimaginably huge financial resources started pouring in the area. He does not agree that locals have an ethnic bias against Wazirs and Mehsuds and cites the example of Commissioner Bazar that exclusively belongs to the Urdu-speaking minority community. "We never had objected to that as they haven't forced their way through the ruthless use of violence," he says adding that the tribal migrants do not hesitate to even kill their competi-



tor. "They get their way cleared through one bullet."

Behram tells that the worsening of law and order situation has forced his rural clients to source their needs from somewhere else. Moreover people either refrain from celebrations or practice these secretly. "People live in a constant state of fear. How can you expect them to celebrate marriages? They prefer to hold the few rituals inside their homes and behind closed doors."

The recent spate of Talibanization is proving as the last straw for Behram's business. The new set of values being enforced through fear and violence equates celebrations of all sorts with the sins of high order. No doubt that Behram is disappointed and hopeless about the future of his homeland.

porous borders and with the connivance of corrupt vigilance agencies. The migrant Pashtuns had initially set up their make-shift shops in corners of DI Khan. They were able to beat their local competitors for low prices of their smuggled merchandise but many disgruntled losers also point fingers at the sophisticated guns that these businessmen wield. They say that they have used brute force to chase the locals out of their businesses. Their shops initially could be spotted at the fringes of the city but now they own many markets, like Mehsud Market.

All migrants from tribal areas to DI Khan are not economic migrants that are always in search of greener pastures. Many have left their homes to avoid the fighting between Taliban and Pakistan Army. But Seraiki locals have little sympathy for any migrant from tribal areas. The disgruntled locals prefer to see all of them as usurpers and criminals and an ethnic tension hangs in air all over the district. The frustrated locals who are fast losing control over their livelihood resources may have become too subjective in their feelings. Yet there is no doubt these migrants are armed to the teeth and they also know how best to use these. The introduction of "Kalashnikov culture" in DI Khan has wrecked its peace and ruthless killing has become the favorite strategy for the groups struggling to further various causes and pursue different interests. This is not a coincidence that the influx of migrants from tribal agencies and a phenomenal rise in worse kind of sectarian violence in the district have happened during the same period. Dera Ismail Khan has been the scene of cold blooded killing of Shia persons in recent years. There have been suicide

attacks, ambushes, target killings and planned mass murder. The killers perform 'their sacred duty to wipe the land clean of the infidel Shias' on the one hand and on the other every killing increases the economic space that their gang occupies in the district. The crime thus not only ensures better status in life after death, it also translates into 'worldly benefits' for fellow believers or tribesmen.

Dera is certainly not new to sectarian strife but it has never been the cut throat campaign that it has become now. In most of the recent incidents, the perpetrators have carefully planned to first assemble the people of Shia community at one place before triggering a deadly device right at the place of assembly. They ensure that the damage is immense and have the guts to even intimidate the local medical staff not to treat the injured to further maximize their killing rate. The planned nature of these attacks and the carefully engineered strategy points to the fact that these are more than the routine outbursts of sectarian hatred as witnessed elsewhere in the country. Local people believe that Shias only serve as a decoy in the game that actually aims to maul, cow down and disperse original inhabitants of Dera to create room for all sorts of gangs of tribesmen to thrive. 'The plan' seems to be successful as dwellers of Dera have lost all the businesses and most of the valuable arable lands to the new migrants. They already feel discriminated against by the Pashtun bureaucracy in terms of government jobs. There are little signs that the law and order situation in Dera and the North and South Waziristan will improve sooner. Many thus have opted to migrate to the neighboring Bhakkar district.

SAP-Pk partner in district

Sustainable Development, Education, Rural Infrastructure, Veterinary Care, Environment (SERVE)

Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan) is the Southern-most district of North West Frontier Province (NWFP). It derives its name from the district headquarter town D.I. Khan. It has river Indus on the East, across which starts the area of the Punjab Province. In the West lies the Tribal areas and the South of the district is again bounded to areas of the Punjab. The district is spread over an area of 7,326 sq. km. It has a total population of 905,000 according to 1999-2000 estimates, with urban and rural population breakup of 18.3% to 81.47% respectively.

SERVE started functioning in 1999 for the betterment of the majority of the population, the 81.47% population which is living in rural areas. The organization started its work with the mission to struggle for equal opportunities for all citizens irrespective of their class, color, caste and gender. Working through years, the organization graduated to embrace themes such as peace, justice and democracy as its principle thrusts in its struggle for equality.








SERVE works with community based and people's organizations, especially those formed by the poor themselves in undertaking initiatives for socio-economic develop-

ment. In so doing, the organization tries to reduce poverty and bring about empowerment and self-reliance in the lives of marginalized sectors.

In the last four years, SERVE has succeeded in facilitating formation of effective farmer organizations, women organizations, CBOs and a number of networks of partners. The organization is working both in urban and rural areas of the DI Khan division. The program areas of the organization are agriculture, environment, prisoners' welfare, arts, energy, population planning, appropriate technology, fisheries, population welfare, children welfare, forestry, rural development, community development, handicrafts, sanitation, cooperatives, horticulture, small business credit, housing, transport, culture, health, water supply, welfare of the disabled, income generation, women development, legal aid, youth development/welfare, education, livestock, employment and nutrition. It has in fact a long list of initiatives that it has undertaken since its start. The number of its beneficiaries is therefore in thousands.

SERVE operates through its office at D.I. Khan. It has 23 staff members. It has been partner of SAP-PK in SDGP.

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